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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Following the signature of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the 
European Communities and member states of the EU, Albania passed to more advanced 
contractual relations with the EU, making a step ahead towards the subsequent phases of the 
European integrating process. The SAA reflects the so-called Copenhagen1 and Madrid 
criteria for becoming an EU member, as sanctioned in the Treaty of the European Union2 .  
 
The SAA signing was mistakenly interpreted as a government victory, albeit the process 
preceding the signature was a fruit of several year’s work, launched in 1991 after Albania 
established diplomatic ties with the EU. For this reason, the annual European Commission 
Report, published in 8 November 20063, and the Enlargement Strategy4 should have been 
considered in the climate of the continuity of a dialogue that is naturally intensified through 
findings and critical assumptions. On the contrary, the so-called European Commission’s 
constructive ambiguity could not be saved from black and white readings and interpretations in 
favor or against of what is considered a victory, a regress or a status quo by the political 
majority or the opposition. 
 
In face of the European resoluteness outlined in the Enlargement Strategy, according to 
which following Bulgaria’s and Rumania’s membership the enlargement process can be 
continued only after an institutional adjustment within the EU, Albania would have to 
accomplish the reforms required by Brussels and define them as its political priorities. In 
addition to the Enlargement Strategy, the European Council Conclusions of 14-15 
December 2006 cleary state that the EU should not set in advance a future enlargement date 
before a candidate country ends it membership negotiation process5, as in the case of 
Rumania and Bulgaria.  
 
The Enlargement Strategy says that a full implementation of obligations deriving from the 
SAA constitutes the sole guarantee for passing to other phases proceeding Albania’s 
membership in the EU. Issued two months after the publication of the European 
Commission Report and of the Enlargement Strategy, this study deals with key elements of 
these documents, analyzing to what extent the recommendations produced therein are 
translated into priorities and tangible actions by the Albanian politics. 
 
                                         
1 Any country seeking membership of the European Union (EU) must conform to the conditions set 
out by Article 49 and principles laid down in Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union. Relevant 
criteria were established by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 and strengthened by the 
Madrid European Union in 1995. To join the EU, a new member state must meet three criteria:  
political criteria: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and 
respect for the protection of minorities; economic criteria: existence of a functioning market 
economy and the capacity to cope with pressure and market forces within the Union; acceptance of a 
Community acquis: ability to take on the obligations of the membership, including adherance to the 
aims of political, economic and monetary union. 
2 See, Article 49 in correlation with Article 6 (1) of the Treaty of of the EU. 
3 See, Report of the Commission of the European Communities, COM (2006) 694 final, Brussels, 
8.11.2006. 
4 See, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006-2007, COM (2006) 649, Brussels, 8.11.2006. 
5 See, more specifically paragraph 7 of the conclusions of the European Council 14-15 December 
2006. 
  
 
 
4 
 
2. LACK OF COOPERATION AND POLITICAL CONSENSUS 
 
 
The European political opinion often refer to the fact that unlike other countries of the 
region, no political grouping in Albania, even a peripherical one, rejects the Euro-Atlantic 
integration process. But, is this enough to bring to life the European dream of Albanians? 
Of course not! The political consensus should be developed though a real cooperation 
between the ruling parties and the opposition on the main development and transformation 
challenges the country faces, these being essential challenges for the European integration. 
 
It is in this context that the assessment of the European Commission Report in connection 
with the role of the Parliament as the main institution of a constitutional democracy should 
be understood. Handing the report over to the Parliament for the first time indicated exactly 
this. At the same time, the Report unhesitatingly highlights the fact that the workings of the 
Parliament face technical and administrative shortfalls, a limited budget that does not focus 
on its core tasks in a stable way,  problems of the voting procedures and equipment that do 
not yet ensure transparent and undisputed results. 
 
According to the Report the interventions of the Constitutional Court and of the President 
of the Republic have been proper and efficient. In fact the action of the Constitutional Court 
and use of the presidential veto against a considerable part of the parliamentary majority 
initiatives (justified by the latter as raison d’etre), have put into question the efficiency of the 
Parliament. The recent decision of the Constitutional Court, declaring unconstitutional the 
legal provisions on the basis of which the Territorial Adjustment Council of the Republic of 
Albania decided to demolish the overpass at “Zogu i Zi”, raises an even more sensitive 
question such the constitutionality and lawfulness in exercising public authority as well as the 
fact that Albanian citizens are faced with the financial consequences closely related to this 
decision-taking6. 
 
The Report emphasizes that “Albania should demonstrate that it has capacities to reach a political 
cooperation without an intervention from abroad”. However, two months after the publication of 
the Report and following an echoed pledge to approve a resolution on transforming the EU 
recommendations into real actions, one month after the entry into force of the Interim 
Agreement it can hardly be said that the political class conceives the European integration as 
a process that it should embrace for the country’s transformation and progress towards the 
European standards.  
 
On the verge of the local government elections, considered as the routine test of a country 
that has now been associated in the EU, the Albanian political setting is beset by tension, 
conflictuality, and particularism, centered in the populist rhetoric, a deformed Government-
Parliament- President-Prosecutor General- Judicial System relationship, a laking electoral 
reform, which should have been founded on political representation, non-deformation of 
the people’s will, and on the cooperation between the ruling coalition, opposition, civil 
society, business groups, that is currently missing. 
 
 
 
 
                                         
6 See, Judgement of the Constitutional Court, no. 29, 21.12.2006. 
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3. NEED FOR A VISIONARY GOVERNANCE AND FOR 
CONSTRUCTING A MODERN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION  
 
 
The government plays the main role in the country’s process of rapprochement to the EU, 
although it is not the only actor in the process. In order to guarantee the success of this 
long-term process, among other things, government will have to bridge communication gaps 
and involve the opposition, interest groups, various communities and the civil society in 
decision-making. It is only in this way that the European integration process, which is 
nothing else but the transformation and development of the country towards the European 
standards, will move closer to the daily needs of the citizens. 
 
In that perspective, the EC Report underlines the Government’s efforts to define the costs 
of the integration process, to draft a National Strategy for Development and Integration and 
launch 23 sector strategies and cross-sector strategies. But the Report does not analyze the 
implementation, difficulties and novelties to be introduced by this process in connection 
with the budgeting process, as over this time Albania has not suffered from lack of strategic 
documents, but willigness to put them in practice.  
 
Drafting and implementing these documents is rendered more difficult if we refer to a 
shocking finding of the Report, according to which the process of restructuring the public 
administration has led to diminishing and interruption in strengthening the administrative 
capacities. In fact it is difficult to strike a fair balance between the European integration 
process requirements for a stronger and more efficient administration and the Government 
on a diet. Also, it is even more difficult to measure the political willigness of a Government 
to carry on with reforms for Europeanizing the country where the governance willigness is 
not focused on strengthening the public administration, while observing the constitutional 
principles and the law on the basis of which, like the ADN of a modern society, the public 
administration should function. 
 
However, this is only one side of the medal. The other side is related to the conclusions to 
be drawn from Graphic no 1, according to which the central institutions have a tendency to 
disregard the civil service legislation and to undermine the decisions of the Civil Service 
Commission, even though the decisions of this institution are binding on everyone. This 
conclusion matches that of the European Commission Report. The graphic shows that the 
lack of legal certainty goes hand in hand with the lack of career planning and lack of 
performance management in the civil service and political appointments.  
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Graphic 1. Number of decicions of the Civil Service Commission that have not been 
enforced in Central Institutions for the period January-October 2006 
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Source: Civil Service Commission, 2006 Statistical Data. 
 
The Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Energy, Ministry of the Interior 
and the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Customer Protection stay at the top of the list of 
institutions failing to enforce decisions of the Civil Service Commission. The only central 
institution that has completed the restructuring process in line with the civil service 
legislation is the Ministry of Education and Science. 
 
Official data taken from the Civil Service Commission show that over 70% of the appeals by 
individuals affected by the public administration restructuring have been upheld by the 
Commission. The fact that such a high percentage of dismissals has been found in breach of 
the law by the Commission indicates that the restructuring process has been grounded on 
illegal considerations that have nothing to do with the career and professionalism system and 
that the Department of Public Administration was incompetent in managing the civil service 
in compliance with the merit and career principles and in some instances has acted in 
contravention with the legislation in force. Such disregard for legislation by the institutions 
mentioned above and the Department of Public Administration have financial consequences 
that will have to be borne by the Albanian taxpayers, as two, or, sometimes even three 
individuals are paid for the same position. 
 
It seems like neglecting the strengthening of the public administration in compliance with 
the Madrid criterion and replacing it with horizontal structures that operate under the direct 
dependency of the Prime Minister have not been that efficient. Furthermore, the EC Report 
does not hesitate to mention the centralization tendencies of the government, as many 
decisions are taken by the Prime Minister, causing delays in major actions. Practice shows 
that a greater involvement of the Prime Minister in the implementation of obligations 
deriving from the European integration process is necessary, but this involvement appears to 
be more effective when it is in proportion with strengthening the administrative capacities, 
as the institutional memory of the process. 
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4. CHALLENGE OF BUILDING AN EFFICIENT JUDICIARY 
SYSTEM IN THE ABSENCE OF A UNIFIED EUROPEAN 
STANDARD  
 
Spartak Ngjela, a distinguished attorney at law and politician, in his recently-published book 
entitled “Albanian reform, avoiding the tyrannic character of politics”, analyzes in detail the main 
pillars of liberal democracy and capitalism, including constitutionality, parliamentarism, 
market, free elections and the rule of law. Mr. Ngjela describes the judiciary as non-
functioning, because “it is not independent; moreover, it has no personality and it cannot even be said 
that it is capable of fulfilling all the tasks that should be performed in a system of a liberal democracy”7.  
 
The organization and functioning of the judiciary is analyzed by the Report, underlining the 
initiatives of the High Council of Justice to avoid the conflicts of interest, to increase 
transparency in the judiciary and to offer more training programmes for the new magistrates. 
However, the judicial procedures are still prolonged and often ambiguous. Independence of 
judges is still threatened and their financial treatment is inadequate. As a consequence, the 
judiciary needs to undergo continuous reforms that are crucial for the development of the 
country, a guarantee for the SAA implementation and an impetus for the European 
integration process. 
 
In this context it is important to mention that the draft-law approved by the Council of 
Ministers should addresses three main aspects during parliamentary debates, namely 
mentioned by the European Commission Report:  
 
- Enhancing the independence and constitutional protection of judges;  
- Increasing the salaries and defining status of the judicial administrative staff;  
- Overcoming the duplication of the judiciary inspectorates of the High Council of 
Justice and the Ministry of Justice.  
 
The EU, which is based on a corpus of values, laws, standards and democratic institutions 
inspired by the constitutional traditions of the Member States, identifies in its legal 
documents and strategy the unique role of the justice system in general and that of of the 
judicial power in particular in terms of safeguarding and enriching these values8. 
 
Unified European standards on the judiciary reform are hard to be identified at the 
community level. In some cases, the European Commission has recommended different 
approaches on the same issue. For instance, the Commission has continuously asked 
Slovakia to remove the probationary clause for judges, while it has encouraged Slovenia to 
provide for a five-year period of probation for its judges9.  
 
Notwithstanding there are widely-accepted standards, which through constituting common 
values of the EU Member States, influence the judicial reform process in the states aspiring 
EU membership while leaving to the latter space for action and choice. The European 
Commission has used these standards, even though through different approaches, to 
                                         
7 See, Spartak Ngjela, Albanian reform, avoiding the tyrannic character of politics, p. 219, (2006). 
8 See, European Commission Strategy Paper, (2001) www.eumap.org . 
9 See, Monitoring the EU Accession Process – Judicial Capacity, p. 20, (February 2002)  www.eumap.org . 
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monitor the reforms in the judiciary. These standards can be summarized in the obligations 
of every state to guarantee an independent and competent judiciary.  
 
The judiciary itself should not abuse under the shield of independence. In order to address 
the negative perception that public opinion generates in relation to the judiciary performance 
a long chain of reforms should be carried out. In the case of Albania these should start with 
legal education, professional development of the judges and prosecutors which is flawed vis-
à-vis the country’s development challenges. The lack of legal certainty that characterizes the 
pubic life in Albania can assume a new dimension only through strengthening of the 
judiciary10. 
 
 
5. ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY SHOULD NOT BE 
TRANSFORMED INTO A GOAL IN ITSELF 
 
 
Fight against corruption and the populist rhetoric that has often accompanied the process, 
besides accomplishments, has also produced an unreal perception, according to which 
Albania’s rapprochement process to the EU is mainly related with the progress in fighting 
corruption. Fight against corruption has been and still is one of the main priorities for 
Albania as it is vital for the economic and institutional development of the country and for 
meeting the obligations arising out of the European integration process. In that context, the 
European Commission Report acknowledges the progress so far while on the other hand 
underlines effective interventions by independent institutions in the cases when the anti-
corruption policy has been developed outside the constitutional framework.  
 
The unit used by the European Commission for measuring the progress of the anti-
corruption policy is the decisions of the judiciary, which in a certain way deprives of 
legitimacy any tendency for transforming fight against corruption into a goal in itself. In 
2004 the number of sentenced persons reached 171, while for 2005 the number was 237. 
The number of disciplinary proceeding for corrupted prosecutors is another indicator of the 
measures undertaken to fight corruption. Also, the Report values the reduction of 
corruption in tax and customs services, reforms for reducing the state’s role in the economic 
and social life of the country, such as the simplification of administrative and licensing 
procedures. 
 
But, corruption appears in different forms, depending on the development of the country.  
In fact, what we label corruption in developing countries is not the same phenomenon as 
corruption in developed countries. In the latter, the term corruption usually designates 
individual cases of infringement of the norm of integrity11. In the former, corruption actually 
means particularism 12—a mode of social organization characterized by the regular distribution 
of public goods on a nonuniversalistic basis that mirrors the vicious distribution of power 
within such societies. 
                                         
10 See on this argument, Spartak Ngjela, Albanian reform, avoiding the tyrannic character of politics, p. 219-
220, who defines the judiciary as the epicenter for the protection of human dignity and the 
democratic system per se. 
11 See, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Corruption: Diagnosis and Treatment, Journal of Democracy, Volume 17, 
No. 3, July 2006. 
12 See, Guillermo O’Donnell, Illusions about Consolidation, in Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-
han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien, eds., Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1997), 45-47. 
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Few anticorruption campaigns dare to attack the roots of corruption in societies where 
particularism is the norm, as these roots lie in the distribution of power itself. Instead, 
anticorruption strategies are adopted and implemented in cooperation with the very predators 
that control the government and, in some cases, the anticorruption instruments themselves13. 
 
In a society like Albania where the public scene is overwhelmed by particularism, the fight 
against corruption entails improving and effectively implementing the legal framework, so 
that it can be real, effective, in compliance with the constitutional principles and beneficial to 
the development and modernization of the country. Furthermore, the fight against 
corruption calls for for a new political approach, concerted action, mutual control and 
coordinated strategies from different stakeholders, and above all a governance capable to 
precede the wounds from which corruption and crime emerges. This can be achieved 
through political, legal, economic and social reforms and through building a justice system 
premised on legality and professionalism.  
 
 
6. COMPETITIVENESS AND SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 
 
 
In talks related to the EU membership criteria, often political conflictuality, rhetoric and lack 
of knowledge of the process defer the real debate on competitiveness and development of 
Albanian economy, as if the European integration process has no economic features, and no 
connection with the development and transformation of the country14.  
 
As to the economic criterion, the Report analyzes the prudent monetary policy pursued by 
Albania, in compliance with the IMF recommendations, and the salutary macroeconomic 
environment that has been characterized by a strong GDP growth. This growth seems to be 
seriously threatened by the energy crisis that has a direct impact on the country’s economy 
and business. 
 
As shown in Table 1, Albania’s Gross Domestic Product, despite the continuous increase, is 
still low compared to the average per capita GDP in the EU (19%), or compared to the 
GDP of the states that became EU members in 2004 (29%). Albania’s GDP is lower than 
the GDP of Bulgaria and Rumania that became part of the EU family on 1 January 2007 
(47%), or the GDP of Croatia or Turkey that are negotiating the EU membership process 
(47%). Albania’s GDP is also lower that the average GDP of other Western Balkans 
countries (74%).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
13 See, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Corruption: Diagnosis and Treatment, Journal of Democracy, Volume 17, 
No. 3, July 2006. 
14 Concerning the economic criteria, see, Just what is this ‘absorption capacity’ of the European Union?, 
Policy Brief No. 113, Center for European Policy Studies,  www.ceps.be . 
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Table 1. Gross Domestic Product per capita as compared to the countries of the EU, 
Western Balkans and Turkey 
 
Source: European Commission official website (www.ec.europa.eu) 
 
The debate on raising the GDP is high even in the newly-admitted states. According to 
estimations, in 2014 the Czech Republic shall reach 74% of the EU average GDP, while the 
respective figure for Hungary is 69.1%, Poland 56.8%, Rumania nearly 47%, Slovenia 82.1% 
and Turkey nearly 45.8%15.  
 
Remittances are calculated at about 14.6 % of the GDP for 2005, nearly 19 % more than 
2004 becoming a relatively sustainable resource of revenues, but at the same time confirming 
that the Albanian economy continues to rely to a relatively great extent on remittances. 
Revenues from remittances should be closely analyzed and considered with the readmission 
agreements signed by Albania with the European Communities and with most of the EU 
Member States, which define the rules and repatriation procedures for citizens that reside 
illegally in the community area.   
 
On the other hand, these agreements and other measures taken by the EU Member States 
aim at improving the process of integration of Albanian citizens living in the community 
area. As a consequence further integration can be accompanied by a reduction of 
contributions from remittances. For this reason, the Albanian economy should seriously 
start thinking of other alternatives, while gradually reducing dependency from remittances. 
 
Meantime, according to the Commission Report the business environment is uncertain and 
unclear as it develops in the absence of the principle of legal certainty. Property restitution and 
compensation is still slow and does not serve as a solid basis for developing an economy in 
which competition and the right to property are respected.  
 
Building a strong macro-economic basis is not enough to ensure an economic growth. 
According to Hernando de Soto respect for the right to property is of great importance in 
the economic growth process16. A weak environment of property rights contributes to 
discouragement of investments, insecurities and complications for long-term planning, lack 
of efficiency of the judiciary, which as a whole do not encourage a salutary and honest 
business climate based on fairness.  
 
                                         
15 See, D. Gros and A. Steinherr, Economic Transition in Central and Eastern Europe, 2nd edition, chapter 
9, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2004). 
16 See, World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Index: Identifying the Key Elements of Sustainable 
Growth, p. 4 (2006). 
GDP per capita  
Albania 
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GDP per capita as compared to the countries becoming EU members in 2004 29% 
GDP per capita as compared to the average of Bulgaria and Romania  47% 
GDP per capita as compared to the average of Croatia and Turkey 47% 
GDP per capita as compared to the average of the Western Balkan Countries 74% 
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The positive steps undertaken for reducing the administrative barriers cut the average 
business registration time from 30 to 8 days but they have to be accompanied by reforms to 
address challenges related to the relatively high cost for creating or closing down a business, 
the limited immovable property documentation, the continuing high percentage of the 
informal economy and the public administration performance. 
 
Competitiveness as an impetus for growth and economic sustainability should be considered 
closely with the level of productivity, increase in exports and establishment of an 
institutional setting17 that is characterized by political stability, openness and transparency in 
managing public resources, transparency of the judicial system operating in compliance with 
the law and a regulatory framework responsive to business development18. 
Unfortunately, the political debate in Albania is focused less and less in the vocational 
training and building a trained labor force, capable of embracing the latest technologies. The 
Lisbon Agenda, aimed at transforming Europe in the most competitive region in the world 
by 2010, highlights the importance of efficient labor markets qualifying them as a pre-
condition for increasing productivity19.  
 
7. ARE THE SAA PRIORITIES REFLECTED IN BUDGET 
COMPONENTS? 
 
The entry into force of the Interim Agreement on 1 December 2006 caused confusion of the 
media, as the latter reported that this agreement marks the establishment of the free trade 
area. In fact, one of the goals of the Agreement is a gradual establishment of the free trade 
area over a maximum period of 10 years, starting from the entry into force of this 
Agreement20.  
 
In 1999 the EU offered Albania a General System of Preferences, in accordance with which 
a unilateral trade liberalization regime was established by the EU, while Albania was required 
to fulfill some standards21 in order to be able to benefit from this regime. On the basis of 
Regulation 2007/2000, the EU offered to Albania a preferential autonomous regime through 
the completion of the concept of rules of origin and the establishment of a free trade area 
for the countries included in the Stabilization and Association Process.  
 
Despite the European incentives, the level of Albanian exports towards the community area 
is still low, supporting the fact that any EU-offered incentive should be followed by creating 
market infrastructure and establishing standards. It is in this context that the EC 
Commission Report should be considered, since, according to it, in most of the fields such 
as in the public procurements, intellectual and industrial property, market surveillance, food 
                                         
17 See, Daniel Kaufmann (2005), Global Competitiveness Index 2006, World Economic Forum. 
18 According to the Global Competitiveness Index, the drivers of the productivity and 
competitiveness are organized in 9 phillars, including basic requirments such as institutions, 
infrastructure, macro-economy, health and primary education; efficency enhancers such as high education 
and training, market efficency and technological readiness; and the subindex innovation and sophistication 
factores such as business sophistication and innovation. 
19 See, Lisbon Agenda 2004,  www.ec.europa.eu . 
20 See, Article 3 of the Interim Agreement. 
21 See, Regulations of the Council of the EU 1763/99 and 2820/98. 
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safety, metrology and calibration, the veterinary and phytosanitary measures, environment, 
personal data protection, no substantial progress has been observed.  
 
This is not a favorable situation, and if not addressed with priority does not offer 
possibilities to its subjects to secure the expected profits from the agreement. Unfortunately, 
the recently approved state budget (see graphic 2) is not SAA-oriented, missing the chance 
of a gradual and strategic establishment of conditions to benefit from the opportunities 
offered by the European standards reflected in the SAA.  
 
Graphic 2. State budget allocation for 2007 by ministry and institution 
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 Source: Ministry of Finances, State Budget Package for 2007 
  
The weight of budgetary expenditure for each institution is calculated in relation to the the total 
budget. 
 
This graphic shows an unbalanced distribution of the state budget. Funds allocated to the 
Ministry of Public Works, Transports and Telecommunication amount to 20.57% of the 
state budget. Whereas the Ministry of European Integration is the least financed institution, 
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receving only 0.06% of the state budget, although the tasks and the role it should play grow 
parallel to the integration process of the country22.  
 
Leaving aside the ironical coincidence that the Ministry of European Integration appears as 
the least funded ministry after signing the SAA, graphic 3 identifies a cut by half of the 
weight of the budget of the Ministry of European Integration compared to 2005, and a 
decrease of 21% compared to 2006.  
 
Graphic 3. The three-year tendency of the budget of the Ministry of European 
Integration 2005-2007 
 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance, State Budget Package 2007. 
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Ministry of European Integration Budget (in 
thousandas of Lek) 
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Why was the Ministry of European Integration budget reduced by half? Has this institution 
ended its mission, or is there a lacking political vision for giving this institution a say? 
 
                                         
22 See, Decisions of the Council of Ministers No. 580, 10.09.2004 “On the scope of activity of the Ministry 
of European Integration”. 
Buxheti i  Ministrise se Integrimit per periudhen 2005-2007
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
140000
160000
180000
200000
2005 2006 2007
Vitet
V
le
ra
 n
e
 0
0
0
 L
e
k
e
0.00%
0.02%
0.04%
0.06%
0.08%
0.10%
0.12%
0.14%
P
e
sh
a 
n
e 
T
o
ta
li
n
 e
 B
u
x
h
et
it
 
In
st
it
u
ci
o
n
a
l 
n
e
 (
%
)
 Buxheti i Ministrise se Integrimit
Pesha e Buxhetit te MI ndaj Totalit te Buxhetit Ministror dhe Institucional
  
 
 
14 
Ther is a mechanical interpretation, according to which the Ministry of European 
Integration’s role should be reduced after establishing units of European integration in the 
line ministries. Quite on the contrary, the role of this institution, regardless of its place in the 
institutional hierarchy, which in the best case should not be one of the line ministries but a 
principal structure at the Council of Ministers coming directly under the the Prime Minister, 
should be increased to the benefit of the process of approximation of the domestic 
legislation with the acquis communautaire, of monitoring of the SAA obligations, of 
coordination and absorbtion of Community assistance as a supporter of the European 
Partnership priorities, the SAA, and consequently the development of the country.  
 
Another priority of the institution remains coordination and provison for the voluminous 
translation process of the acquis communautaire into Albanian, the process of informing and 
communicating the rights and obligations deriving form the SAA for various interest groups, 
cooperation with local government, community and citizens. At the same time, following the 
Madrid criterion, the Ministry of European Integration should become a promoter of 
administrative capacities building through recruiting specialized staff in universities and 
prestigious institutes, but also providing for continuous training schemes. 
 
The entry into force of the SAA will be accompanied by the establishment of some joint 
EU-Albania structures, which should necessarily be coordinated by the Ministry of 
European Integration. The entry into force of the SAA requires the establishment of 
permanent or ad-hoc structures, which will also be coordinated by the Ministry of European 
Integration. Obviously, the new structure of the Ministry of the European Integration, the 
lack of a political vision, administrative capacities and the insignificant budget weight 
(0.06%) do not help this institution to comply with the obligations imposed by the legal 
framework.  
 
Were the role of the coordination structure to be reduce and the “ball” to be passed in the 
“field” of line institutions how would the funding of these institutions in line with the the 
SAA priorities look?  
 
The budget of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Energy, which is a key institution for 
administrating the main part of obligations deriving from the Interim Agreement in the 
internal market area, amounts to only 1.38% of the state budget. The budget of the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Food and Consumer Protection amounts to only 2.76% of the state budget, 
although this institution should play an important role in the process of adopting the 
European standards that are voluminous in the case of fields covered by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Food and Consumer Protection. The budget of the Ministry of Environment, 
Forests and Water Management is equal to 0.94% of the state budget, rendering almost 
impossible the gradual implementation of European standards in the field of environment, 
not forgetting that meeting the standards in the environmental field is accompanied by high 
financial costs. 
 
Table 2 includes some of the priority fields directly related with the SAA. Some of its 
components constitute detailed elements of ministerial budget, and, for this reason, their 
importance is seen closely in connection with the relevant ministries. The second column 
contains calculations of the weight of these activities compared to the total budget of 
Ministries and Institutions. 
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Table 2.  State budget components by institution 2007 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance, State Budget Package for 2007 
 
If we analyse the allocated funds and the administrative structure as opposed to the obligations 
or the profit opportunities offered by the SAA, for instance in the veterinary field and its 
implications in the market, it is clear that the allocated funds are insufficient to establish a 
proper structure capable of ensuring the largets portion of safety in the food and animal-origin 
products and by-products chain. This administrative shortcoming punishes domestic producers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INSTITUTION 
 
 
 
 
 
TOTAL BUDGET 
ALLOCATION (in 
thousands Lek) 
 
 
 
 
WEIGHT 
COMPARED TO 
INSTITUTIONAL 
BUDGET 
 
 
 
WEIGHT OF THE 
INSTITUTIONS 
COMPARED TO 
THE GENERAL 
TOTAL OF 
BUDGET 
EXPENDITURE 
2006 
Public Procurement Service 26.508,00 4% 0,01% 
Council of Ministers 612.000,00   0,31% 
      0,00% 
Support for Economic Development  1.660.450,00 61% 0,85% 
Services of Market, Accreditation and 
Inspection 
159.090,00 6% 0,08% 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Energy 
2.706.150,00   1,38% 
      0,00% 
Food Safety and Consumer Protection 1.337.961,00 25% 0,68% 
Support for Agricultural Products, Non-
Agricultural and Marketing 
978.100,00 18% 0,50% 
Agricultural Counseling and Information 159.500,00 3% 0,08% 
Ministry of Agriculture, Food and 
Consumer Protection 
5.415.970,00   2,76% 
      0,00% 
General Prosecutor’s Office 961.000,00   0,49% 
Constitutional Court 91.000,00   0,05% 
General Directorate of Customs 1.255.000,00   0,64% 
General Directorate of 
Standardization 
26.000,00   0,01% 
General Directorate of Taxation 1.598.000,00   0,82% 
Directorate of Metrology and 
Calibration 
24.000,00   0,01% 
School of Magistrates 53.000,00   0,03% 
High Council of Justice 65.000,00   0,03% 
Competition Authority 51.000,00   0,03% 
      0,00% 
Justice and Internal Market 29.270,00 25% 0,01% 
Institutional support for the Integration 
Process 
23.810,00 21% 0,01% 
Ministry of Integration 115.000,00   0,06% 
TOTAL BUDGET ALLOCATION 2007 195.973.018    
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while making impossible the increase of exports towards the EU, although it is enabled by the 
liberalization offered by the SAA.  
 
Even in the case we consider collection of revenues from this sector as a priority (production of 
food and animal-origin products and by-products), again the veterinary control structure according to 
the community model would ensure sufficient revenues only for an initial investment. In the 
years ahead, this structure will collect the necessary funds for its functioning alongside the 
production guarantee for internal consumption and exports in the EU countries. 
 
The same can be said regarding the budget allocated to the Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Energy for purposes of market surveillance, accreditation and inspection, at a time when the 
market surveillance structures, inspection and consumer access are still inexistent. Although 
there are many difficulties, market reforms should rapidly start if we want to give a new 
development dynamic to the Albanian economy. 
 
Also, the budget allocated to public procurement is low, while progress in this field is vital for 
improving governance of the public sector and opening the sector to the competitive offers. 
The insufficient budget for the public procurements is only one of the several problems, 
followed by the lack of administrative capacities in the Public Procurement Agency, direct 
bidding procedures and the lack of competition.  
 
Furthermore, the law on public procurements recently passed by the Parliament lacks the 
guarantee, as it does not provide for the establishment of an independent decision-making body 
for treating the appeals in bidding procedures, whose members can be elected by the 
Parliament by a 3/5th vote upon proposals coming from institutions and different groups. This 
solution would guarantee the political consensual basis in the Parliament, the independence and 
guarantee of office of the Commission members, avoiding the unsuccessful precedent of the 
constitution of the National Council of Radio and Television and that of the Steering Council 
of the Albanian Radio Television. On the contrary, the creation of the procurement23 
Ombudsman who can be elected by the Parliament upon the Council of Minister’s proposal 
cannot play the same role that plays an independent authority not only in terms of election but 
also decision-making24 powers.  
 
Also, the intellectual and the industrial property as priorities of the SAA are not reflected in the 
budget. There is a need for addressing the fragmented responsibilities of the various 
government actors, strengthening administrative capacities and specialising the judges. The 
SAA defines that within four years Albania should ensure the same intellectual and industrial 
property as in the European Community. In order to ensure this protection, there is a need for 
a properly defined strategy accompanied by a sufficient funding.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
23 See, articles 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 of the law on public procurement recently passed in the 
Parliament. 
24 See on this matter, In search of a realistic agenda for Albania’s EU Integration, Policy Brief 1, AGENDA 
Institute, www.agendainstitute.org . 
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8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
 Albania’s integration progress requires a pragmatic approach where the process 
opportunities and risks should be considered in a balanced and neutral manner. The 
government responsibility to include the main stakeholders and the public opinion in a 
frank debate is obvious. 
 
 Political consensus and cooperation climate amid the political actors should be 
materialized through a tangible consensual agenda, mainly in connection with issues of 
electoral reform, economic development, institutional development, market reform as 
well as with the continuous reformation of the judiciary, as decisive issues for the 
country’s development, guarantees for the SAA implementation and an impetus for the 
European integration process. 
 
 Despite the importance of the observance of election standards’, of the fight against 
corruption, traffics and organized crime, the European integration process should not 
equal only these. On the country, it shall be transformed into a multi-dimensional 
development, modernization and transformation process as enshrined in the acquis 
communautaire. 
 
 The Albanian government should work hard to build the administrative capacities in 
compliance with the Madrid criteria through a lawful and transparent recruitement of 
specialized staff in universities and prestigious institutes, providing for continuous 
training schemes, implementing the civil service legislation, and more specifically 
implementing the Civil Service Commission and the Appeals Court decisions. It should 
also take measures to judge the persons that have caused damages to the state budget 
due to violation of the civil service legislation. 
 
 To ensure a better coordination of the multi-dimensional obligations arising out of the 
process, the Ministry of European Integration can be transformed into a structure at 
the Council of Ministers coming directly under the Prime Minister. This can better 
guarantee the fleshing out of the European integration priorities in the country’s 
development agenda. But, at the same time, a day-to-day vertical control of the line 
institutions from the Prime Minister could be ensured as well as a more direct 
relationship with the Parliament, which at the end is expected to face a voluminous 
workoad due to the approximation of the domestic legislation with the acquis. 
 
 The economic integration of Albania should be regarded in compliance with the 
projections of the Albanian GDP components as the only real possibility to reach the 
average GDP of the EU countries. The Albanian economy should start generating new 
alternative resources, gradually reducing dependency from remittances and better 
investing in the existing resources. Also, competitiveness as an impetus for the 
economic growth and sustainability should be considered closely with the level of 
productivity, increase of exports and establishment of an institutional environment 
characterized by a political sustainability, openness and transparency in public resources 
management, a transparent judiciary system that operates in compliance with the law 
and a regulatory framework responsive to the business.  
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 The liberalization regime offered by the EU through the SAA risks to not produce the 
expected outcomes, damaging the domestic producers and the Albanian consumers, 
through failing to increase exports towards the EU and lowering the public opinion 
confidence in the real opportunities offered by the European integration of Albania. 
The Albanian government should undertake legal, institutional and budgetary initiatives 
to develop market infrastructure as the only possibility for the development and 
modernization of the country, including SAA priorities as: food safety, sanitary and 
phytosanitary issues, transport, rural development, agricultural and agro-processing products, 
environment, public procurement, competition, state aid, customs, taxes, intellectual and industrial 
property, standardizations and certifications, calibration, consumer protection, market surveillance, 
improvement of business climate, legislation on commercial companies. 
 
 In this context, the recently approved law “On Public Procurement”, should necessarily 
reflect the obligations deriving from the Directive 2004/18/CE and 89/665/EEC on 
the establishment an independent decision-making body for treating the appeals and 
the bidding procedures, whose members can be elected by the Parliament by a 3/5th of 
vote, upon proposals coming from the institutions and different groups. This solution 
would guarantee the political consensual basis in the Parliament, the independence and 
guarantee of office of the Commission members, avoiding the unsuccessful precedent 
of the constitution of the National Council of the Radio and Television and that of the 
Steering Council of the Albanian Radio Television. On the contrary, the creation of the 
procurement Ombudsman who can be elected by the Parliament upon the Council of 
Minister’s proposal cannot play the same role that plays an independent authority not 
only in terms of election but also decision-making powers.  
 
 The recently approved budget needs to be harmonized with these priorities, which are 
essential for the economic development and utilization of the opportunities offered by 
the SAA.  The improvement of physical infrastructure, as witnessed in the amount of 
the state budget allocated to the Ministry of Public Works, Transports and 
Telecommunication (20.57%) should go hand in hand with the improvement of market 
infrastructure. More specifically, there is a need for increase of budget and strengthen 
of administrative capacities for the Ministry of Economy Trade and Energy, Ministry of 
Agriculture, Food and Consumer Protection, Ministry of Environment, Forests and 
Water Management.  
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